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The fourth amendment exclusionary rule has been the subject of
debate since its creation by the United States Supreme Court sixty-eight
years ago.I Simply stated, this rule of evidence holds that contraband or
other forms of incriminating evidence obtained by unlawful police activ-
ity may not be used to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Defenders of the
rule see it as necessary for the preservation of the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,2 relying upon
the rationale that if the courts will not allow illegally obtained evidence
to be used at trial, law enforcement officers will be deterred from gather-
ing evidence through unlawful conduct. 3 Critics of the exclusionary rule
claim that the case law interpreting the rule has become so confused and
contradictory that police cannot know whether or not their conduct is
lawful, and that the rule has been expanded by the courts to apply to
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice; District Attor-
ney, Alameda County, California, 1969-1981; LL.B., University of California School of Law,
Boalt Hall; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
** Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; A.B., University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Cruz.
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3 For commentary in support of the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Kamisar, A Defense of the
Exclusionary Rule, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1979); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
5 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionagy Rule and the Right of Pri-
vag, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 327 (1973); Allen, The Wolf Case.- Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the
Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 65 (1957); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio: At Large in the Fi/2y States, 3 DUKE L.J. 319
(1962); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties." Some "Facts" and "Theories" 53 J. CR IM. L.
C. & P.S. 171 (1962).
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situations in which the rule cannot possibly serve as a deterrent.4
Debate concerning the exclusionary rule has heightened in recent
months as Congress examines proposals to modify the rule or abolish it
entirely.6 In addition, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime7 (Task Force) has recommended that the courts and legislature
adopt the position that otherwise admissible evidence may not be ex-
cluded at trial if it has been obtained by a law enforcement officer act-
ing in a "reasonable and good faith belief" that his conduct comports
with fourth amendment law.
This article will first discuss the origin and purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule and the problems presented by its application, and will then
advocate legislative adoption of the reasonable, good faith statement of
the rule enunciated in the Fifth Circuit decision of United States v. Wil-
iams8 and subsequently urged by the Task Force.
II. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule was created in 1914, when the United States
Supreme Court held in Weeks v. United States9 that evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in federal criminal
prosecutions. Many commentators criticized this doctrine from the
start,' 0 but the rule became firmly implanted in the federal criminal
justice system. The states, however, were divided in their opinion of the
rule. In the three decades following Weeks, sixteen states adopted the
rule while thirty-one states refused to accept it.II
It was not until 1949 that the Supreme Court was squarely con-
fronted with the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied to state criminal prosecutions. In Wolf v. Colorado,'2 the Court
held that although the guarantees of the fourth amendment applied to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,' 3 the fourteenth amendment did not forbid the admission of evi-
4 See generaly Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964);
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionagr Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Levin, An Alternative
to the Exclusionag Rulefor Fourth Amendment Violations, 58 JUDICATURE 74 (1974).
5 S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
6 S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
7 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL
REPORT 55-56 (1981) [HEREINAFTER CITED As TASK FORCE REPORT].
8 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
9 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10 See, e.g., Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtainedby Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 481
(1922).
' ' See discussion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1949).
12 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Black, J., concurring; Douglas, J., Murphy, J., and Rutledge, J.,
dissenting in separate opinions).
13 Id. at 28. Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides in part: "nor shall any
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dence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.' 4 Twelve years
later, in Mapp v. Ohio,'15 the Court reversed its decision in Wof and held
that because the fourth amendment right of privacy was enforceable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment, "it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government. ' 16
It is now clear that the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule is
the deterrence of unlawful law enforcement activity. When the rule was
first articulated in Weeks, the Court justified its holding on two grounds:
deterrence of unlawful police conduct and maintenance of judicial in-
tegrity. In Elkhs v. United States,17 the Court stated the deterrence
ground as follows: "Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
Constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it."'18 The judicial integrity rationale
was based on the notion that courts should be prevented from being
''accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are
sworn to uphold."' 19 Early exclusionary rule cases mentioned both ratio-
nales. However, over time, as the rule has been explicated, the rationale
of judicial integrity has been essentially abandoned.
The emergence of the deterrence purpose as the reason for the rule
is aptly illustrated by the Court's opinions in fourth amendment retroac-
tivity cases. In Linkletter v. Walker,20 the Court, considering the issue for
the first time, refused to apply retroactively its decision in Mapp v.
Ohz .21 The Likletter Court observed that the basis for Mapp's applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to the states was its finding that the rule
"was the only effective deterrent to lawless police action."'2 2 Applying
that premise to the Linklelter case, the Court noted that it "cannot say
that this purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective.
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
14 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter noted: Granting that in practice the ex-
clusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not
for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due
Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if consistently enforced,
would be equally effective.
338 U.S. at 31.
15 367 U.S. 643 (1961). One year earlier, in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960),
the Court had ruled that evidence obtained by states' law enforcement officers during a
search that would be illegal under the fourth amendment if conducted by federal officers
could not be admitted for use in a federal criminal prosecution.
16 367 U.S. at 655.
'7 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
18 Id at 217.
19 Id. at 223.
20 381 U.S. 618, 636-39 (1965).
21 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22 381 U.S. at 636.
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The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred and
will not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved."' 23 Likewise, in
Desist v. United States,24 the Court observed that "[t]he exclusionary rule
'has no bearing on guilt' or the 'fairness of the trial,"' and it accordingly
"decline[d] to extend the court-made exclusionary rule to cases in which
its deterrent purpose would not be served."'2 5
More recently, in United States v. Pe/tier,26 the Court held that the
policy underlying the exclusionary rule did not require the suppression
of evidence seized in searches which were clearly unlawful under stan-
dards established in Almeida-Sanchez,2 7 but were lawful at the time they
were carried out, which was prior to the time that Almeida-Sanchez was
decided. The Court observed that although Supreme Court decisions
applying the exclusionary rule to unconstitutionally seized evidence
have referred to "the imperative of judicial integrity," the Court has
relied principally upon the deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary
rule.28 The Court further noted that the lesson to be learned from the
retroactivity cases is that "the 'imperative of judicial integrity' is ... not
offended if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith
that their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub-
sequent to the search or seizure have held that conduct of the type en-
gaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the
Constitution. '29 In the same vein, the Court stated, "[w]here the official
action was pursued in complete good faith. . . the deterrence rationale
loses much of its force."'30 Focusing specifically on the deterrence pur-
pose, the Court concluded that "evidence obtained from a search should
be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." '3 '
The declaration in the retroactivity cases of the deterrence ration-
ale for the exclusionary rule is also apparent in the Court's approach to
determining whether the rule should be applied in a variety of other
circumstances. In United States v. Calandra,32 the Court held that a wit-
ness before a grand jury could not refuse to answer questions based on
23 Id. at 637.
24 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
25 394 U.S. at 254 n.24 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1965)).
26 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
27 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Border Patrol's warrantless automobile search, acting without
probable cause, 25 miles from Mexico border held unconstitutional under fourth amend-
ment).
28 422 U.S. at 536.
29 Id. at 537-38 (emphasis omitted).
30 Id. at 539 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).
31 Id. at 542.
32 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. In that case,
the Court stated that, "the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to
redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim. . . . Instead, the
rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. . .. ,,33 Similarly, in United States v.
Janis,34 the Court refused to exclude from a federal civil proceeding evi-
dence seized unconstitutionally but in good faith by state law enforce-
ment officers. The Court concluded that "exclusion from federal civil
proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforce-
ment officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deter-
ring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs
imposed by the exclusion." 35 Because the evidence in both Calandra and
Janis had been obtained unlawfully, application of the judicial integrity
rationale would have required suppression of the evidence. However, as
noted above, the Court considered the deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule as its primary rationale and concluded that the evidence
should not be suppressed.
The deterrence rationale was also used as the basis of exclusionary
rule analysis when the Court held that unlawfully seized evidence is ad-
missible to impeach the defendant's testimony at his criminal trial; 36
that no person other than the defendant has standing to ask for the invo-
cation of the exclusionary rule;37 and that the rule should not be applied
to exclude evidence when it has been seized during an arrest for a viola-
tion of a statute which is declared invalid after the arrest has taken
place.3 8 In sum, the judicial integrity rationale has essentially been
33 Id. at 347. Citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), the Calandra Court
continued: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the Constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 347.
34 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
35 Id. at 454.
36 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). In an earlier case, Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), the Court had held that if a defendant perjured himself on direct
examination, the prosecution could impeach him with evidence illegally seized from him in
connection with an entirely different prosecution.
37 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) and United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727 (1980). In Rakas, the Court noted that "[d]espite the deterrent aim of the exclusionary
rule, we never have held that unlawfully seized evidence is inadmissible in all proceedings or
against all persons." 439 U.S. at 134 n.3. In Payner, the Court stated:
the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities
undertaken in the name of law enforcement. . . . But our cases also show that these
unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of ille-
gality. Instead they must be weighed against the considerable harm that would flow
from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
447 U.S. at 734. See also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
38 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). The Court stated:
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abandoned by the Court as a factor in its exclusionary rule analysis.
Unfortunately, as the analysis in the next section illustrates, many courts
have lost sight of the true purpose of the rule and have applied the rule
even when the deterrent purpose cannot be served.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A certain amount of rhetoric seems to arise in any debate concern-
ing the merits of the exclusionary rule as an appropriate part of our
criminal justice system. Before beginning an analysis of the problems
posed by the present application of the rule, it is important to address
some of the misplaced arguments raised in the current debate. Upon
proper analysis, the issues contained in these arguments should be char-
acterized as non-issues in that they deal with areas irrelevant to the
question of whether or not the rule should be modified or abolished.
One of these non-issues relates to the impact of the rule on the
crime rate. Supporters of the rule claim that advocates for reform of the
present rule argue incorrectly that modifying the rule will reduce the
crime rate.39 The fact, however, is that advocates for reform do not
claim that any such change is a panacea for crime rate reduction. Any
thoughtful consideration of contemporary crime must recognize, unfor-
tunately, that there are no panaceas, due no doubt to the lamentable
fact that we simply do not know the necessary causes of crime itself. On
the other hand, advocates for reform do point out that the rule does in
fact operate to free known murderers, robbers, drug traffickers and other
violent and non- violent offenders and that a rule of evidence which has
such a result without a reasonable purpose to support it is intolerable.40
Another non-issue relates to the impact of the rule on criminal
cases. Supporters of the rule cite a 1979 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report which found that evidence was actually suppressed in
only 1.3% of a sample of federal criminal cases. They argue that modifi-
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action. No conceiv-
able purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which, at the time it
was found on the person of the respondent, was the product of a lawful arrest and a
lawful search. To deter police from enforcing a presumptively valid statute was never
remotely in the contemplation of even the most zealous advocate of the exclusionary
rule.
Id. at 38 n.3.
39 See, e.g., W. Greenhalgh, Testimony before Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime (June, 1981) (available from the ABA).
40 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); M. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT BY ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 12-13 (National Legal Center for the
Public Interest 1982) [hereinafter cited as M. WILKEY]; Fourth Amendment Exclusiona,7 Rule Leg-
islation, 1981. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate judiciag Comm., 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1981) (statement of Prof. Steven R. Schlesinger) [hereinafter cited as Exc/u-
sionagy Rule Legislation Hearings].
1982]
JENSEN AND HART
cation or abolition of the rule is, therefore, not a significant criminal
justice issue.4 1 Aside from the analytic flaws in the GAO report 42 ---for
example, it did not consider cases never presented to United States At-
torneys because the law enforcement agency involved felt they presented
fourth amendment problems, any common sense perspective on the
criminal justice world must take note that the exclusionary rule is a nec-
essary consideration of every police arrest and seizure of physical evi-
dence, that the rule is the overwhelming component of drug case
litigation, and that the appellatecourt- overload faced by many judicial
districts in this country is due in no small measure to appeals of exclu-
sionary rule issues. 43 The argument that, somehow, the exclusionary rule
has little impact on the criminal justice process is totally disingenuous.
The real issue concerning the exclusionary rule is independent of
both the crime rate and any statistics pertaining to the resolution of
individual court cases. The heart of the problem lies in the application
of the rule: the courts have gradually expanded application to situa-
tions in which the rule cannot possibly serve as a deterrent. This expan-
sion has distorted the preeminent purpose of the rule- deterrence of
police misconduct-with the result that the truth finding process is im-
peded, and society is done a grave and unnecessary injustice.
The clearest example of a misapplication of the exclusionary rule
arises when courts suppress evidence seized by police in executing a duly
authorized search warrant. In such cases a second or third judge, in
disagreement with the judge who issued the warrant, invalidates the
search despite the absence of any police misconduct. Consider in this
regard United States v. Karathanos .4 4 In that case, Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service agents obtained a warrant to search certain business
41 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, REP. No. GGD-79-45 (1979). See also Fourth Amendment
Exclusionag Rule Legislation, 1981." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate
Judicia y Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1981) (statement of William W. Greenhalgh on
behalf of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section). The GAO report was also
cited in testimony by Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, to support Mr.
Sachs' belief that critics of the rule greatly exaggerate the extent of the rule's impact on the
release of federal criminal suspects. Bills to Limit the Exclusionary Rule in Federal Criminal Proceed-
ings and to Eliminate and Establish a Damage Action Alternative to the Rule.- Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Law of the SenateJudicia.7 Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981) (statement of
Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland).
42 For example, the GAO study did not consider cases in which law enforcement agencies
made an internal decision that a case may have fourth amendment problems and that, there-
fore, the case should not even be brought to the attention of the United States Attorney.
Additionally, the study does not reflect the number of cases resolved before there was any
ruling on the suppression motions. Finally, the GAO study ignores the state court system,
which handles the bulk of the country's criminal justice work.
43 See, e.g., M. WILKEY, supra note 40, at 14-16.
44 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
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premises. The warrant was issued based on an affidavit that the magis-
trate found sufficient to establish probable cause that the defendant was
involved in the criminal harboring of illegal aliens. The district court
judge, however, disagreed with the finding of the magistrate who issued
the warrant and held that probable cause had not been stated. 45 The
evidence that had been obtained by the search was suppressed, even
though the appellate court acknowledged that there was no suggestion
that the agents had acted improperly either by procuring the warrant in
bad faith or by making a material misrepresentation in the warrant
application. 46
United States v. Shorter4 7 is another example of the exclusionary rule
being applied where an authorized search warrant is invalidated by a
second judge or court. In that case, local police and agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested a suspected Ohio bank rob-
ber at his home. After the arrest, the FBI agent telephoned a federal
magistrate and stated his grounds for a search warrant which was then
issued by the magistrate as permitted by law.48 The subsequent search
produced incriminating evidence, including bait bills and a firearm.
The trial judge ruled the search lawful, but the conviction was reversed
on appeal. The appellate court decided that although the officer had in
fact been placed under an oath by the magistrate which incorporated all
the testimony already provided in the course of reciting the grounds for
the warrant, the failure of the magistrate to require the oath at the be-
ginning of the telephone conversation violated the law because the ap-
plicable Federal Rule requires that the oath be obtained
"immediately." 4
9
45 399 F.Supp. 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aj'd, 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428
U.S. 910 (1976).
46 531 F.2d at 35.
47 600 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1979).
48 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
49 600 F.2d at 589. See also United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1981), in
which the defendant was charged with possession of the illegal substance phencyclidine, or
"angel dust." The indictment was based upon items seized in a search conducted pursuant to
a search warrant issued by a state district judge, based upon the affidavit of a Minneapolis
police officer. The officer had obtained this information from two unnamed informants.
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the warrant had
been issued without probable cause. The motion was heard by a United States Magistrate,
who filed a report and recommendation upholding the validity of the warrant. The report
and recommendation was adopted by the United States District Court, which denied the
motion to suppress. In the subsequent trial the defendant was convicted of the offence
charged. He appealed the conviction on fourth amendment grounds; the Eighth Circuit
overturned the conviction. The court held that the policeman's affidavit did not establish
probable cause in that some of the information therein was stale, id. at 324-25, and that the
affidavit did not contain enough information about underlying circumstances to adequately
establish credibility or reliability of the informants. Id. at 326-27.
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Both Karathanos and Shorter involve disagreements between judges
about judicial conduct-there is no police misconduct involved. The
police were carrying out their duties as society expects them to do: the
officers provided their information fully and honestly to the court and
proceded to carry out the orders of the court once the warrants were
issued. Suppression of evidence in instances such as these does not serve
the purpose of the exclusionary rule-the deterrence of police miscon-
duct. In fact, it only serves to damage both a community's perception of
justice and the morale of law enforcement officers who have followed
the rules only to have the evidence suppressed on the premise that they
have violated the Constitution.50 Proper police conduct is thus falsely
labelled as illegal.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule also is not served
when courts apply the rule to situations where the appellate court cases
are not at all clear, where the law is thoroughly confused or even where
the cases are in flat contradiction. For in these instances, police are con-
fronted with the question of the legality of a warrantless search in the
field under circumstances where existing decisions do not clearly state a
rule of law.
In its 1980-81 term, the United States Supreme Court decided two
cases that aptly illustrate this point, New York v. Belton51 and Robbins v.
Calformia.52 The cases are remarkably similar factually. In both cases,
police officers lawfully stopped a car, smelled burnt marijuana, discov-
ered marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car, and lawfully
arrested the occupants. Thereafter, in Robbins, the officer found two
packages wrapped in green opaque paper in the recessed rear compart-
ment of the car, opened them without a warrant, and found thirty
pounds of marijuana. In Belton, the officer found a jacket in the passen-
ger compartment, unzipped the pocket without a warrant, and found a
quantity of cocaine.
Both cases required an analysis of the "automobile exception"
cases53 which pertain to the validity of warrantless searches of cars and
50 Another problem with the application of the exclusionary rule arises in state court cases
when law enforcement officers have acted upon an existing statute that is later declared to be
unconstitutional, and evidence is suppressed despite the fact that the police conduct was law-
ful at the time the search was conducted. In all fairness, we cannot expect our law enforce-
ment personnel to anticipate future court decisions that may invalidate a statute as it exists
on the books at the time of the search. Yet, that is in essence what courts seem to expect by
applying the exclusionary rule in such circumstances. In contrast, federal courts do not apply
the exclusionary rule in those situations. See Michigan v. DiFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
51 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
52 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
53 It is established that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, "sub-
ject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United
[Vol. 73
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their contents; the doctrine of "search incident to arrest" as defined by
Chinel v. California ;54 and the watershed case of United States v. Chad-
wick, 55 in which the Court held that police must obtain a warrant to
open a closed container in an automobile where the possessor of the
container has exhibited a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in that
particular container.56 Three Supreme Court justices opined that both
searches were legal; three justices opined that they were both illegal; and
three justices controlled the ultimate decision that Robbins was illegal
and Belton legal. To add to the confusion, these results reversed both
decisions at the state level. The Robbins search now said to be illegal had
been found to be legal by the California Supreme Court,57 and the Bel-
ton search now said to be legal had been found to be illegal by the New
York Court of Appeals. 58 When Robbins was decided in 1981, fourteen
judges had reviewed the search: seven found it valid; seven invalid.
It is small wonder that after Robbins and Belton had been decided,
Justice Brennan observed that, "[t]he Court does not give the police any
'bright line' answers to these questions. More important, because the
Court's new rule abandons the justifications underlying Chimel, it offers
no guidance to the police officer seeking to work out these answers for
himself."59 To the same end, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Robbins,
cited language from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire :60
State and federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities
must find quite intolerable the present state of uncertainty, which extends
even to such an every day question as the circumstances under which po-
lice may enter a man's property to arrest him and seize a vehicle believed
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The "automobile exception" was first enunciated in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in which the Court recognized that the mobility of an
automobile created the possibility that the vehicle might be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which a warrant must be sought. In a later case, the Court emphasized that
the "automobile exception" comes into play only where exigent circumstances exist. There
must be some demonstrated need for immediate action: a fleeting opportunity to search; a
defendant bent on flight; contraband or stolen goods or weapons that are easily removable;
the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobiles; or confed-
erates waiting to move the evidence. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62
(1971). However, the Court had suggested in a footnote that although a warrantless search of
an unoccupied vehicle may be permissible under Carroll, there was no precedent for extending
Carroll to cover searches of closed containers. Id. at 461 n. 18.
54- 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
55 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
56 Id. at 14.
57 People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1980), reu'dsub noa., Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, (1981).
58 People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S. 574 (Ct. App. 1980), reo'd
sub noa., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, (1981).
59 453 U.S. at 470 (emphasis omitted).
60 403 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971).
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to have been used during the commission of a crime.6 1
It was not surprising that the United States Supreme Court was imme-
diately thereafter faced with some of these same issues last term in United
States v. Ross,62 in which the Court asked both sides to address the ques-
tion of whether Robbins should be reconsidered. Like Robbins, the Ross
case involved an automobile stop, the arrest of the driver and, upon
search of a closed container within the car, the discovery of contraband.
The Ross Court recognized the importance of striving for clarification of
the law and acknowledged that judicial disagreement concerning the
proper interpretation of Arkansas v. Sanders,63 which had followed Chad-
wick, was at least partially responsible for the fact that Robbins had been
decided the prior term without a Court opinion. 64 In an attempt to
clarify the case law in this area, the Court reversed Robbins, dist-
inguished Chadwick and Sanders, and held that if probable cause justifies
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle under the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, it justifies the search of every part of the vehi-
cle and its contents, including all closed containers, that may conceal
the object of the search. 65
Although the Ross decision will likely prove helpful in guiding po-
lice practices in searches conducted during highway stops, this clarifica-
tion unfortunately came too late to affect the countless search and
seizure cases that followed upon, pondered upon and expanded upon
the Chadwick and Sanders decisions. 66 In acknowledging that lower
courts had differed in their interpretations of those cases and police of-
ficers needed more guidance in interpreting the law, the Ross Court rec-
ognized the great degree of confusion spawned by Chadwick in both
61 453 U.S. at 436.
62 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
63 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
64 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
65 Id. at 2172. The Court stated that its result was not inconsistent with its holdings in
Chadwick and Sanders. The search in Ross was based upon probable cause to search the entire
vehicle and therefore came within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. In
contrast, in both Chadwick and Sanders the police had probable cause to search the footlocker
and the suitcase respectively before either came near the automobile-it was merely coinci-
dental that those particular containers ended up in a car. Id. at 2167.
66 The Robbins case is an apt illustration of this point. The defendant, Jeffrey Robbins, was
arrested and convicted in 1975. The United States Supreme Court overturned the conviction
in 1981, concluding that the search was unconstitutional and that the evidence should be
suppressed. As a result the California prosecutor dismissed the case.
To add to the irony, at the time Robbins was arrested he was on probation for a federal
drug offense. His subsequent drug activities in California constituted a probation violation
but federal authorities decided not to revoke his probation in light of the fact that the prison
term for his California conviction would be five years to life. By the time the Robbins Court
had overturned the conviction, it was too late to bring federal charges with the result that no
action was taken for his violation of probation.
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federal and state courts. In California, for example, the watershed car
stop-cum-closed container cases were People v. Minjares67 and People v.
Dalton.618 In the former case, police in hot pursuit arrested an armed
robber in a stolen car, lawfully opened the trunk, but were found to be
in violation of the Constitution when, without obtaining a search war-
rant, they unzipped a totebag found in the trunk and removed three
handguns and loot from the robbery. In Dalton, police lawfully stopped
a car, lawfully looked in the trunk, but were said to be unlawful when
they opened a metal box found in the trunk and removed a weapon and
narcotics. In both these cases the existing law at the time of the search
was such that it was clearly reasonable for the officers to believe their
conduct was lawful, yet the California court found the searches illegal
under cases decided subsequent to the search.69 As Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in his dissent from a denial of stay in Minja-res,70 the case was
not one in which the officers lacked probable cause to arrest and search;
rather, the defendant was to go free:
solely because of a good-faith error on the part of the arresting officers,
who were not sufficiently prescient to realize that while it was constitution-
ally permissible for them to search the trunk ... courts would later draw a
distinction between searching the trunk and a tote bag in the trunk.71
Yet the California court found the searches illegal under cases decided
subsequent to the search and, in so doing, proved that they were also not
"sufficiently prescient" to recognize, as we now learn from the Ross deci-
sion, that Chadwick does not render these searches unconstitutional.
In reflecting upon the rules of law resident somewhere within these
decisions, one should also consider an important fact which is often
overlooked in exclusionary rule discussions. The search in Robbins actu-
ally took place on January 5, 1975, long before Chadwick was decided on
June 21, 1977. Similarly, the Minjares and Dalton searches took place
prior to the court decisions upon which the California Supreme Court
based its conclusions that both searches were illegal. At the very least, it
67 People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 887 (1979).
68 People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979), cert. deniedsub
noa., California v. Dalton, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
69 Consider Mifnjres, for example. At the time of the search it was clear that under
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), a warrantless search of the automobile, if based on
probable cause to believe that the auto contains contraband or evidence of a crime, was-
permissible when it took place after the auto had been towed to a police station. In Adinj'ares,
there was probable cause to search both the trunk and the tote bag. It cannot be considered
unreasonable for the police to have thought that search of the bag was lawful given that there
was probable cause to conduct the search.
70 California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (on application for stay of mandate pend-
ing disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
stay).
71 Id. at 918-19.
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is fair to say that the applicable rule at the time of those searches was
more elusive at that time than it is today, yet the courts impose the final
definitive sanction of suppression of reliable, trustworthy evidence in
such situations on the assumption that this judicial act will deter police
misconduct.
With respect to this typical exclusionary rule analysis, it is instruc-
tive to note that the standard to which police are held in fourth amend-
ment cases is stricter than that to which attorneys must comply when
they are judged under the sixth amendment 72 guarantee that criminal
defendants be represented by competent counsel. Consider, in this re-
gard, People v. Russell,73 another car stop and closed container case de-
cided by a California appellate court in 1980. In Russell, once again
there was a lawful stop, lawful opening of the car trunk, and police dis-
covery of marijuana when they unzipped a flight bag. At trial the
search was uncontested, and the defendant convicted. On appeal it was
contended that his counsel at trial was incompetent under the standard
announced in People v. Pope,74 which requires that an appellant "show
that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably
competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates. ' 75 In support of this
position, the defendant argued that counsel had not asserted that open-
ing the flight bag required a search warrant under the requirements of
People v. Dalton ,76 a California search and seizure case in which the court
had applied the holding in Chadwick, despite the fact that the search
took place prior to the Chadwick decision. The court rejected the de-
fendant's contention that the attorney was incompetent, stating:
It is first noted that the hearing on Russell's motion to suppress evidence
occurred February 13, 1979. The opinion of People v. Dalton was filed six
months later, August 16, 1979. It is doubtful that Pope requires, under
pain of being held to have furnished constitutionally inadequate represen-
tation, such prescience on the part of a lawyer for one criminally
accused.
77
Implicit in that language is a conclusion that the state of the law of
search and seizure was such that a criminal defense attorney, when con-
fronted with the issue in the courtroom, was not expected to be aware
that there was a fourth amendment violation on those particular facts.
Indeed, the court found that a reasonably prepared attorney was not
expected to anticipate that a future search and seizure decision, People v.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
73 101 Cal. App. 3d 665, 161 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1980).
74 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
75 Id at 425, 590 P.2d at 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
76 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
77 101 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
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Dalton,78 would hold similar police conduct unlawful. Yet, as was illus-
trated in the Dalton and Robbins decisions, there is no such hesitation in
requiring "such prescience" on the part of police officers faced with pre-
cisely the same problem of legal analysis which confronted the attorney
in Russell.
The consequence of applying the exclusionary rule in the cases dis-
cussed above is two-fold. First, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is
not served when the officers believe, in good faith, that they are per-
forming a lawful search. When law enforcement officers obtain a war-
rant in good faith or when they make a reasonable, good faith attempt
to predict the decisions that future courts will make, there exists no logi-
cal basis for excluding the evidence they have gathered. Applying the
rule in these cases fails to further in any degree the rule's deterrent pur-
pose, since good faith conduct reasonably engaged in is by definition not
susceptible to being deterred by the imposition of after-the-fact eviden-
tiary sanctions.
Second, application of the exclusionary rule when the police have
acted reasonably and in good faith results in attaching a false label to
proper police conduct. This adversely affects the criminal justice system
by fostering the public perception that police are engaged in lawless,
improper conduct when that is simply not the case. The Supreme Court
recognized some of these effects in Stone v. Powell,79 in which it stated:
[t]he disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the po-
lice officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of
the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the
concept of justice. Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful
police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amend-
ment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite ef-
fect of generating disrespect for the law and the administration ofjustice.8 0
The unjustified acquittals of guilty defendants due to application of
the exclusionary rule have resulted in a growing concern by our citizens
that our system of justice is lacking in sense and fairness. Unfortunately,
it seems unlikely that any of these conceptions by the public will change
as long as the exclusionary rule remains in its present form and courts
continue to expand its application to situations where law enforcement
conduct has been manifestly reasonable.
78 24 Cal. 3d 850, 598 P.2d 467, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1979),cer. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
79 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
80 Id. at 490-91.
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IV. THE REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCEPTION
Adopting the construction of the exclusionary rule announced by
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams8a would solve many of the
problems discussed above. In Williams, the court held that otherwise
admissible evidence may not be excluded from trial if it has been ob-
tained by an officer acting in a reasonable and good faith belief that he
conducted himself in accordance with the fourth amendment.8 2 This
concept of a reasonable, good faith exception to application of the exclu-
sionary rule is not new to the United States Supreme Court. On the
contrary, the basic premises supporting adoption of such a doctrine have
been discussed in several court decisions during the past decade. The
initial premise is that the exclusionary rule's primary rationale is the
deterrence of illegal police conduct. As this article already has estab-
lished, the Court has continued to emphasize the deterrence rationale,
and it is now considered to be the essential reason behind the rule.8 3
The Court also has begun to develop a relationship between the rule's
deterrence purpose and the concept of a good faith exception. This
trend commenced with Michigan v. Tucker,8 4 in which the Court stated
that:
[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that
the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct
which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit
evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in
those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a
greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official
action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence ration-
ale loses much of its force.85
Likewise, in United States v. Peltier,8 6 the Court explained that:
[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct
then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can
be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment. 87
81 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
82 Id. at 847.
83 See supra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
84 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
85 Id. at 447.
86 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
87 Id. at 542. The Peltier Court also noted that in the cases dealing with retroactivity of
the exclusionary rule, it had "recognized that the introduction of evidence which had been
seized by law enforcement officers in good-faith compliance with then-prevailing constitu-
tional norms did not make the courts 'accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitu-
[Vol. 73
GOOD FAITH RESTA TEMENT
In a later case, Stone v. Powell,88 the good faith issue was mentioned
prominently in both Chief Justice Burger's concurring decision and Jus-
tice White's dissent. The thrust of the Chief Justice's attack on the ex-
clusionary rule was that the "dismal social costs occasioned by the
rule"8 9 are too great to justify continued use of the rule when its deter-
rent effect is merely an unsubstantiated assumption. 90 He stated that
the rule exists as a clumsy, indirect means of imposing sanctions, espe-
cially since the issue of whether the policeman did indeed run afoul of
the fourth amendment often is not resolved until years after the event. 9t
He further stated that the sanction is particularly indirect when the po-
lice go before a magistrate, who issues a warrant; once the warrant is-
sues, there is literally nothing more the police can do in seeking to
comply with the law.92 Noting that the rule was being applied indis-
criminately to all types of fourth amendment violations, however slight,
inadvertent or technical, 93 the Chief Justice suggested that if the rule
should be preserved at all, its scope should be limited to egregious, bad
faith conduct.94
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White observed that prior court de-
cisions had overshot their mark insofar as they aimed to deter unlawful
action by law enforcement officers.95 He stated that to the extent that in
many of its applications the exclusionary rule was not advancing the
deterrent aim in the slightest, the rule was "a senseless obstacle to arriv-
ing at the truth in many criminal trials." 9 3 Although Justice White did
not believe that the rule should be wholly abolished, he was nevertheless
of the view that the rule should be substantially modified so as to pre-
vent its application in those frequent instances where the evidence at
tion they are sworn to uphold."' Id. at 536 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 205, 223
(1960)).
88 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Defendant Powell was arrested pursuant to a local vagrancy ordi-
nance later found to be unconstitutional. The search incident to his arrest uncovered a re-
volver that the defendant had used ten hours earlier to kill someone during a liquor store
theft. Powell was convicted of second degree murder.
89 Id. at 501.
90 ChiefJustice Burger observed that "[n]otwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical
study has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect." Id. at
499.
9t Id. at 498.
92 Id. The Chief Justice declared that imposing an admittedly indirect sanction on the
police officer when he is acting pursuant to a warrant "is nothing less than sophisticated
nonsense." Id.
93 Id. at 501.
94 Id. ChiefJustice Burger expressed irritation at the belief that "[i]ncentives for develop-
ing new procedures or remedies will remain minimal or non-existent so long as the exclusion-
ary rule is retained in its present form." Id at 500.
95 Id. at 538. To this effect, Justice White specifically mentioned Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
96 428 U.S. at 538.
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issue was seized by an officer acting in the reasonable, good faith belief
that his conduct comported with existing search and seizure law.9 7 In
such cases, wrote Justice White, exclusion of seized evidence can have no
deterrent effect: "the only consequence of the rule as presently adminis-
tered is that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the
trier of fact and the truth finding function of proceedings is substantially
impaired or a trial totally aborted."9 8
Thus, in several different contexts, members of the United States
Supreme Court have recognized that the deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is not served when the police officers believe, in good faith,
that they are complying with fourth amendment law. To date, how-
ever, the Court has not addressed directly the question of whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied when the government shows that
the officer's fourth amendment violation was the result of a reasonable,
good faith mistake. The Fifth Circuit answered that very question in
United States v. Williams99 after an exhaustive analysis of the relevant
Supreme Court decisions. A majority of the twenty-four judges of that
court, sitting en bane, concurred in an opinion which concluded that ap-
plying the rule in such a situation would serve no deterrent purpose
whatsoever. 1° The court held:
[h]enceforth in this circuit, when evidence is sought to be excluded because
of police conduct leading to its discovery, it will be open to the proponent
of the evidence to urge that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unau-
thorized, was yet taken in a reasonable, good-faith belief that it was
proper. If the court so finds, it shall not apply the exclusionary rule to the
evidence.101
In justification of this conclusion, the court first noted that the exclu-
sionary rule is not a constitutional requirement. 102 Rather, the court de-
scribed it as "a judge-made rule crafted to enforce constitutional
requirements, justified in the illegal search context only by its deterrence
97 Id.
98 Id. at 540.
99 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
too Williams involved a warrantless arrest and a search made incident to that arrest by a
Drug Enforcement Administration agent at an airport. The agent observed the defendant
disembarking from a non-stop flight from Los Angeles. The agent knew the defendant and
was aware that one year before she had pleaded guilty to a federal drug charge and was
currently free on bond pending appeal on the condition that she stay within certain bounda-
ries near Cincinnati, Ohio. The agent arrested her for "bail jumping." A search of her jacket
produced heroin. After indictment on two drug offenses, the defendant moved to suppress the
drugs, arguing that because the penalty provisions of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3150
(1970), applied only to persons who fail to appear before a court or judicial officer when
ordered to do so, and the agent had no information indicating that she had failed to appear in
answer to such a request, the agent had no probable cause to arrest her. Id. at 833-35.
101 Id. at 846-47.
102 Id. at 841.
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of future police misconduct."' 0 3 The court determined that the deter-
rent purpose was the preeminent purpose behind the rule and noted
that this purpose was not served when the improper police actions were
taken in reasonable, good faith. 10 4 Accordingly, there was no compelling
reason to apply the exclusionary rule in such cases.
The good faith exception announced by the Fifth Circuit is the
same rule urged by the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime. 10 5 In addition, a legislative proposal based on the language in
Williams was introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond in the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 0 6 The Senate bill, S. 2231, states as follows:
Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence which is obtained
as a result of a search or seizure and which is otherwise admissible shall not
be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States if the search or
seizure was undertaken in a reasonable, good faith belief that it was in
conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. A showing that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the
scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a reasonable
good faith belief, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and
material misrepresentation. 10 7
If implemented, this restatement of the exclusionary rule would go
a long way towards insuring that the exclusionary rule would be applied
only in those situations in which police misconduct logically can be de-
terred. Law enforcement officers will no longer be penalized for their
reasonable, good faith efforts to execute the law. On the other hand,
courts would continue to exclude evidence obtained as a result of
searches or seizures which were performed in an unreasonable manner
or in bad faith, such as by deliberately misrepresenting the facts used to
obtain a warrant. Thus, the penalty of exclusion will only be ordered
when officers engage in the type of conduct the exclusionary rule was
designed to deter--clear, unreasonable violations of our very important
fourth amendment rights.
B. OPPOSITION TO ADOPTION OF A REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION
Various commentators have voiced criticism against the good faith
exclusionary rule in recent months. Some of their contentions are the
103 Id. at 841-42 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 440 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979); United States
v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
104 622 F.2d at 843-47. Moreover, the court explained that the rule's application should be
considered in light of its direct effect of preventing the "whole truth" from being told and its
by-product of freeing quality criminals and endangering society.
105 TASK FORCE REPORT, 'upra note 7, at 55.




result of mischaracterizations of the rule itself. Others are grounded
upon incorrect assumptions concerning the nature and motivations of
law enforcement personnel. Still other contentions appear to be
grounded upon misconceptions pertaining to the exclusionary rule's ori-
gin, purpose and effectiveness.
One frequently articulated criticism of the good faith exception is
that the new rule would put a premium on police ignorance. For exam-
ple, Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, recently stated
that "[i]ntroduction of the 'reasonable good faith' test would, I fear, de-
press Fourth Amendment compliance to the level of our tolerance for
the lowest standards of the least informed officer. And there would be
no incentive to do better."' 0 8 Other commentators have predicted that if
the good faith exception is adopted, "[a]ll internal disciplinary efforts of
law enforcement agencies will be totally negated. . . ."09 In both re-
spects, this is not the case. Such assertions ignore the fact that the good
faith exception requires more than an assessment of an officer's subjec-
tive state of mind. In fact, the exception further requires a showing that
the officer's bona fide good faith belief is grounded in an objective rea-
sonableness. As the Wizlliams court explained, the officer's belief in the
lawfulness of his action must be "based upon articulable premises suffi-
cient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe
that he was acting lawfully." i 0 Thus, an arrest or search that clearly
violated the fourth amendment under prior court decisions would not be
excepted from the rule simply because a police officer was unaware of
the pertinent case law. Because the police would still be held to know
the law where it is clear and to act reasonably in instances in which the
law is not so clear, it still would be in the police officer's best interest to
keep abreast of the latest developments in the law. Similarly, law en-
forcement agencies would still have an incentive to maintain continuing
legal education programs for their personnel.
In a similar vein, the good faith exception has been attacked by
parties who intimate that police will be able to plead ignorance of the
law as an excuse for their allegedly unlawful actions, unlike the case for
private citizens who are held to know the law.I' That analogy is inap-
posite. Although a citizen is held to know the law, the criminal law is on
the books, spelled out in black and white. In contrast, a police officer's
108 Bills to Limit the Exclusionay Rule in Federal Criminal Proceedings and to Eliminate and Estab-
Ilsh a Damage Action Alternative to the Rule. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the
SenateJudicia Comm., supra note 41, at 15-16.
109 M. WILKEY, supra note 40, at 35.
11O 622 F.2d at 841, n.4a.
111 See, e.g., More than an Idle Preachment, L.A. Times, Dec. 31, 1981, § II, at 4, col. 1; Exclu-
sionay Rule Legislation Hearings, supra note 40, at 22, United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830,
850 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J., concurring), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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conduct is not so explicitly circumscribed; rather, the law of search and
seizure is increasingly complex and one who attempts to comply with
the law finds very few bright lines to follow. Yet police officers often
must make their decisions in the face of bewildering and contradictory
case law, a seemingly unfair burden in light of the difficulty appellate
judges have in making those same determinations. I I
Finally, opponents of the good faith exception have claimed that
the necessity of determining good or bad faith will encourage the police
to commit perjury.112 Such a conclusion is completely unfounded. This
argument is thoroughly unfair, a gratuitous slur upon the integrity of
police in this country, based upon no more than the imagination of its
proponents.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL MODIFICATION
There is strong indication that Congressional legislation establish-
ing a reasonable, good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would be
held to be constitutional. Congressional action in this area was explicitly
invited by Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,113 in which he
stated that, "the time has come to re-examine the scope of the exclusion-
ary rule and consider at least some narrowing of its thrust so as to elimi-
nate the anomalies it has produced."'" 4 As a possible alternative to the
rule, the Chief Justice suggested that Congress develop a new statutory
remedy for victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures. However,
the tort remedy was not offered as the exclusive acceptable substitute;
the statement of the Chief Justice left the discussion open for examina-
tion of other suitable alternatives.
Supreme Court decisions during the past decade indicate that the
Court today would sustain reasonable congressional action limiting the
rule without the substitution of a new remedy, so long as the modified
rule furthered the Court's articulated purpose of the exclusionary rule.
It has already been established that there is a legal precedent for adop-
tion of the reasonable, good faith exception." 5 The exception is primar-
112 M. WILKEY, supra note 40, at 36.
113 403 U.S. 388, 422-24 (1971). The petitioner alleged that agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics made a warrantless entry of his apartment, searched the apartment and arrested
him on narcotics charges-all acts allegedly done without probable cause. The petitioner
filed a complaint seeking damages for injuries resulting from the agents' violation of the
fourth amendment. The Court held that a federal agent's fourth amendment violation while
acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon
that unconstitutional conduct.
114 Id. at 424.
115 See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
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ily grounded on Supreme Court cases such as United States v. Peltier,1 16
Michigan v. DeFilhppo117 and United States v. Calandra,'18 in which the
Court emphasized deterrence as the exclusionary rule's primary basis
and refused to apply the rule when the conduct of the law enforcement
officer was not capable of being deterred.1 19 The good faith exception is
also consistent with notions of "judicial integrity" to the extent that such
a concept remains as a rationale for retaining the rule in some form. As
the Supreme Court stated in Peltier, "the 'imperative of judicial integ-
rity' is also not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably believed
in good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the
law. .. "12
Finally, it is important to remember that the reasonable, good faith
exception already has undergone constitutional scrutiny and been up-
held in both federal and state jurisdictions. The Fifth Circuit found the
exception to be constitutional in United States v. Williams 12 in an en banc
opinion based upon an extensive analysis of relevant Supreme Court
cases. In addition, the Williams holding has been followed in specific
contexts by the highest appellate courts in two states, New York 122 and
Kentucky, 123 and has been codified by at least two state legislatures. 124
Thus, the exception already has established a basis of constitutional and
legislative support and, given the trend set by United States Supreme
Court cases, it appears that a broader base of support is likely to form
116 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
117 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
118 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
119 See aso Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (no vicarious application of the exclusion-
ary rule); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evidence not excluded from federal civil
proceeding when seized unconstitutionally but in good faith by state law enforcement
officers).
120 422 U.S. at 537-38 (emphasis omitted).
121 622 F.2d 830 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
122 People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877 (N.Y. 1981).
123 Richmond v. Commonwealth, 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2529 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
124 Just last year, Colorado passed a statute that provides that "evidence which is otherwise
admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed by the trial court if the court
determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer ... as a result of a good faith mistake
or of a technical violation." CoLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-308(1) (1981). The term "good faith
mistake" is defined as "a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which
if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause." Id. at § 16-3-308(2)(a). In addition,
the statute defines a "technical violation" to be a reasonable good faith reliance upon a stat-
ute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good
faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later overruled." Id. at § 16-3-308(2)(b). The
Colorado statute, which appears to be based upon the decision in United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), could well mark the start of a
movement by state legislatures to force the courts to apply the exclusionary rule only when
the rule's deterrent purpose will be furthered. See also Searches or Seizures-Unlawful-Ad-
missibility of Evidence, 1982 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 435 (West) (amending ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3911 (1978)).
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over time. 25
V. CONCLUSION
Legislation establishing a reasonable, good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule should be viewed as a measure that simply states the
true scope of the rule. Given that deterrence is the rationale for-the rule,
the situations where law enforcement officers have performed a search
or seizure reasonably and in the good faith belief that their conduct
comports with the law are precisely the ones in which it seems indefen-
sible to exclude the evidence they have gathered. When a court does
order suppression of evidence in such circumstances, it imposes a label of
police misconduct when in fact there is none. The result is that law
enforcement officers must suffer the personal indignity of being branded
as lawbreakers, while at the same time the public is misled into thinking
that there is widespread police abuse when it does not actually exist.
The present application of the exclusionary rule to situations where
the police reasonably and truly believe in the legality of their conduct
also results in disrespect for the courts. It is difficult for the public as
well as law enforcement personnel to maintain faith in the criminal jus-
tice system when it appears that courts are continually abandoning
common sense reasoning in favor of an intricate, inflexible procedural
structure. When evidence is excluded without regard to the reasonable-
ness of the police conduct or the nature of the criminal offense, an unfor-
tunate result is that the truth-finding process becomes distorted.
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule allows the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence to be made without assessment of all the
probative and trustworthy evidence available, thereby rendering the
criminal justice system unreliable and impotent.
Implementation of the reasonable, good faith exception would limit
application of the exclusionary rule to furtherance of its original purpose
of deterrence. As a result, the focus of criminal proceedings would re-
main directed to the process of determining the truth in order to convict
the guilty and free the innocent. In addition, faith in the criminal jus-
125 In a recent opinion, Taylor v. Alabama, 55 U.S. L.W. 4783 (U.S. June 23, 1982) (No.
81-5152), Justice Marshall, writing for a 5-4 majority, declined to recognize the good faith
exception in the context of a confession made subsequent to an illegal arrest. This opinion,
however, appears to have little if any precedential value as an absolute rejection of the good
faith exception in that the State merely raised the issue as an alternative argument and Jus-
tice Marshall treated it as such, summarily dismissing the argument and focusing instead on
case law pertaining to the "fruit of the poisonous tree." In addition, it is unclear whether the
Court's two line comment on the good faith exception is a rejection of the exception as a
general concept or whether the Court merely declined to recognize it in this particular case.
In light of the limited context in which the exception was mentioned, it is unlikely that the
Court has precluded a full review of the doctrine in later cases.
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tice system should be strengthened because the police and public would
no longer be penalized by the unnecessary suppression of reliable evi-
dence. This common sense limitation of the exclusionary rule would
return integrity to our judicial system and law enforcement programs
and therefore should be adopted on a nationwide basis, in both state
and federal courts.
